Quarterly Synopsis of Florida Cases by unknown
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
12-1-1949
Quarterly Synopsis of Florida Cases
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation





CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Equal protection of the laws. A statute dele-
gating public utility rate regulation powers to a public utility board with
county-wide jurisdiction was challenged on several constitutional grounds
by a power company.1 Without discussion of the reasonableness of the classi-
fication, the court rejected an argument that this delegation involved an arbi-
trary geographical classification denying the company equal protection of the
laws. Thus as to classification challenges, county-wide utility regulation is
placed on a par with city-wide regulation. This holding will also be of impor-
tance in connection with delegations of other types of regulatory functions to
boards with county-wide jurisdiction. The court also rejected an argument
that imposition of regulation after the grant of a franchise was unconsti-
tutional.
County purposes. In the above case the court held that expenditure of
county tax monies for board operations was for a county purpose within
Article 9, Section 5 of the Florida Constitution. 2
LEGISLATION. Title. Can the title of an original unconstitutional act
be referred to in considering the validity of the title of an act which purports
to be an amendatory statute? A recent decision answers this question in the
negative. 3 In 1935 the legislature passed a statute with this title: "An Act
Creating the Office of County Attorney in all Counties Having a Population
of not less than 9,000 and not more than 9,300 According to the Federal
Census of 1930; Fixing his Compensation and Prescribing his Duties." 4
In 1943 a special or local law was enacted with this title: "An Act to Amend
Chapter 16882 Laws of Florida, 1935, by Making the Same Definitely Ap-
plicable to the Election, Compensation and Duties of the Office of County
Attorney in Highlands County, Florida, and Validating Elections Held Under
*This section of the SYNoPsIs covers cases from 39 So.2d 557 through 41 So.2d.
Beginning with this issue the QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS OF FLORIDA CASES will comprise
a symposium of the faculty of the School of Law. The Public Law section has been
prepared by Prof. Meisenholder and the Private Law section by Prof. Stephenson.
1. Florida Power Corp. v. Pinellas Utility Board, 40 So.2d 350 (Fla. 1949).
2. Exclusion of females from jury service is not contrary to due process. Bacon
v. State, 39 So.2d 794 (Fla. 1949). (Of course, women may now serve as jurors under
specified conditions).
3. Moore v. State ex reL McDonald, 41 So.2d 310 (Fla. 1949).
4. Laws of Florida 1935. c. 168V2.
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Said Amended Act." 5 The court first held that the 1935 statute was an un
constitutional local law. It then held that the title of the 1943 statute did
not meet the requirements of Article III, Section 16 of the Florida Constitu-
tion, since the subject and real purpose was to create the office of County
Attorney, and thereby enact a new and completely independent piece of
legislation, whereas the title assumed that the office was existent and showed
a clear intention to amend the 1935 statute.
The Act of 1943 could be considered an amendatory act. If it is, then
apparently it is invalid because an act which amends an unconstitutional act
is void.6 However, if the act is to be considered a new independent act, as
the court apparently considered it, then the above rule does not apply but the
title considered independently is not sufficient as the court ruled. 7 However
the title of the statute, even if the statute is to be considered an independent
act, refers to the 1935 act and purpose to amend it. The title of the 1935 act
appears sufficient to cover the subject matter. It might have been argued
that the 1943 title is good since by reference to the title of the 1935 act notice
of the subject matter is given although the latter act is unconstitutional. The
rule is that the title of an amendatory act is sufficient if it refers to the act
amended and the title of that act covers the subject matter of the amendatory
act. Under the above suggestion the unconstitutionality of the first act would
not be material in applying this rule. Since the court considers this act inde-
pendent of the 1935 act in judging the title, will it also take that attitude and
uphold an amendment to an unconstitutional act, if that is possible, in view of
its subject matter and if the title of the amendatory act alone is substantially
satisfactory ?
Special and local acts. In the case just discussed the court merely states
that the 1935 statute is a local law and clearly unconstitutional since requisite
steps for enactment of local laws were not taken. The statute is not potentially
applicable to any county nor is there any reason to believe it embodies a
reasonable classification.6
But an act which authorized counties having a population of over 275,000
according to the last or any future census to construct and maintain bridges
and other projects and issue bonds therefor was said to be a general law
classifying counties on the basis of population for governmental purposes.9
As in various previous cases, the court did not discuss the basis for its
conclusion that the classification was reasonable. On the basis of past cases
5. Laws of Florida 1943, Special Laws, c. 22316.
6. Williams v. Dormany, 99 Fla. 496, 126 So. 117 (1930). It can be argued, how-
ever, that this case and cases cited do not support the rule. There is contrary authority
in other states.
7. A similar case is Wall v. Garrison, 11 Colo. 515, 19 Pac. 469 (1888).
8. Batchelor, Population Statutes Under the Florida Constitution, I MI AI L. Q.
97 (1947).
9. State v. Dade County, 39 So.2d 807 (Fla. 1949).
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it does not appear that population statutes potentially applicable to all counties
or cities (as in this case) are valid merely because the classification is for
governmental purposes.' 0 A similar law authorizing bond elections on the
same date as other elections in counties having a population of more than
210,000 according to the last preceding census was held valid in this case on
the same grounds. Both of these statutes can be justified by strong argument
for the reasonableness of the classifications adopted.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. Notice and hearing. In the case noted above, in-
volving delegation of regulatory power to a county utility board, the court
refused to consider the fact that the statute did not provide for a hearing before
promulgation of rules and regulations by the Board. Since the Board had
not made any effort to issue regulations, this constitutional challenge was
rightfully held to be premature. Other questions were also said to be pre-
maturely raised.
Revocation of licenses. A section of the former statute regulating the
citrus industry provided that complaints against citrus dealers charging
violations of the provisions of the statute could be filed with the Commissioner
of Agriculture. After notice and hearing he was to determine the damage
suffered by the complainant and order payment. If the dealer did not comply
with the order, the section authorized a court suit and provided that the
Commissioner's order should be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated." Such a complaint was filed with the Commissioner. It charged that
a citrus dealer had failed to account in a purchase of fruit from complainant
as required by the statute. In review of the Commissioner's order to the
dealer to pay the account or have his license revoked, the court upheld the
view that the statutory requirement of accounting 12 included payment and
approved the order of payment with a condition of license revocation in the
event of non-payment.Is Justice Barns dissented because the proceeding was
conducted pursuant to the section mentioned above and the dealer had not
been given a hearing upon proceedings brought against it for the purpose of
revoking its license. The succeeding section of the statute 14 provided that the
Commissioner could revoke the license of a fruit dealer when he was satisfied
that such dealer had violated any of the provisions of the statute. This section
did not mention notice and hearing, but apparently after the proceedings in
this case, an amendment was enacted in 1947 providing for notice and hearing.
10. Batchelor, Population Statutes Under the Florida Constitution, 1 MIAI L. Q.
97, 100-102 (1947).
ll.'FLA. STAT. § 596.13 (1941), repealed c. 25149 § 110, Laws of Florida 1949, re-
enacted with changes, c. 25149 § 66, Laws of Florida 1949.
12. FLA. STAT. § 596.11, repealed c. 25149 § 110, Laws of Florida 1949, reenacted
with changes, c. 25149 § 64, Laws of Florida 1949.
13. Mayo v, Market Fruit Co. of Sanford, 40 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1948). Mayo v. New,
40 So2d 365 (Fla. 1949) is a similar case.
14. FLA. STAT. § 596.14, repealed c. 25149 § 110, Laws of Florida 1949, reenacted
with some changes, c. 25149 § 67, Laws of Florida 1949.
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Still a third section provided for revocation of licenses after notice and hearing.
If the statute as it read before 1947 is interpreted to require notice and hearing
before a license can be revoked, then the dealer in this case should have had
notice that revocation of his license was at issue, or at least this question of
revocation should have been tried at the hearing. Justice Barns' opinion
appears to indicate that the dealer did not have such notice.
Jurisdiction of state and municipal regulatory bodies. The relationship
between the powers of the Florida Railroad and Public Utilities Commission
and those of the Miami City Commission in the regulation of intra-city
traffic was considered in an important case.15 A state statute provides that
the state commission may make rules and regulations concerning bus com-
panies under its jurisdiction and such rules shall prevail over conflicting
municipal ordinances and permits.' 6 Another section of the statute provides
that "persons operating motor vehicles" within the limits of a municipality
or between cities and towns whose boundaries adjoin shall be exempt from
the control and jurisdiction of the state commission.1 7 Finally the Code of
Miami requires that a certificate be held by those engaged in transportation
in the city, but exempts any motor vehicle operated under the supervision
and regulation of the state commission. The court held that a carrier certified
by the state commission could not carry intra-city passengers because of
procedural defects in the adoption of a resolution by the city commission
permitting such carriage. A dissent interpreted the statute to mean that the
state certificated carrier could carry intra-city passengers under its state
certificate. Under this view the resolution of the city commission was not a
factor in the case. Thus the majority opinion appears to proceed on the basis
that the governing law divides jurisdiction of the state and city commission
on a territorial basis with respect to intra-city traffic, whereas the dissent
interprets the statute to mean that the state commission controls the inaugu-
ration of such service as to any individual carriers over which it otherwise
has jurisdiction. The language of the statute and the city code may possibly
favor the latter view, but this view would result in two independent bodies
having control of intra-city bus transportation whenever there are both inter-
city and intra-city bus systems in a community. The majority view looks to
the control of intra-city service by one regulatory body. This situation appears
preferable from a practical standpoint.
The court further defined the jurisdiction of the commission over local
municipal transportation in a case holding that the commission had no
statutory authority to regulate a municipally owned street railway which
operated in two cities whose boundaries adjoined. In the opinion it is said
15. Coast Cities Coaches, Inc. v. Miami Transit Co., 41 So.2d 664 (Fla. 1949).
16. FLA. STAT. § 323.07 (1941).
17. FLA. STAT. § 323.29 (1941).
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without any limitation that municipally owned operations are not within the
chapter of the statute which authorizes the commission to regulate railroads.' 8
LABOR RELATIONS. Right-to-work restrictions. In a cse which apparently
is the first of its kind, the court decided that a labor union has no rights under
Section 12 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution as amended
by the so-called right-to-work amendment of 1944 or under Sections 481.03
and 481.09, Florida Statutes.'9 The court stated that a union could bring
a bill in a proper case to restrain an employer from doing various acts, but
not to restrain acts claimed to be in violation of the above right-to-work
provisions. The entire background as well as the express language of these
provisions supports the court's conclusion. While the matter now seems
settled, it is conceivable that in various situations the provisions as inter-
preted in this decision will not be effective as a practical matter to
insure individuals the guaranteed right to work unless unions are also given
enforceable secondary rights by implication. In this respect the Constitution
and the statute ignore the practical realities of labor relations.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS. Validity of Organization. Except as other-
wise provided by statute20 the general rule has been that individual attacks
on the validity of a municipal government must be by information in the nature
of quo warranto with the consent of the Attorney-General. However, if the
organization of a municipality or the annexation of new territory is void be-
cause the enabling statute is unconstitutional or because constitutional rights
of owners of property have been invaded, individuals subject to municipal
burdens have successfully challenged the municipal existence by a bill in
equity.2 ' The court recently extended these cases to allow an equity suit
challenging corporate existence on the ground that "mandatory' "statutory
conditions". "precedent to the valid effectuation of such a political sub-
division" had not been complied with.22 The ruling is limited to cases in
which the corporation has no de facto existence and the suit is not barred
by estoppel, laches or acquiescence. The statutory provision held mandatory
in this case required that two-thirds of the freeholders and registered voters
who are to be included within the municipality attend an organizational
meeting. It is evident that the court went a long way in relaxing the rule
that aside from suits permitted by statute, a quo warranto proceeding at the
discretion of the Attorney General is the sole method of challenging municipal
18. City of St. Petersburg v. Carter, 39 So.2d 804 (Fla. 1949).
In another case in this field mandamus was sought to require license revocation,
State ex rel. Bigler v. City of Miami, 40 So.2d 207 (Fla. 1949).
19. Miami Laundry Co. v. Laundry, Linen, Dry Cleaning Drivers, Salesmen &
Helpers Union No. 935. 41 So.2d 305 (Fla. 1949).
20. FLA. STAT. § 80.01 (1941).
21. Chavous v. Goodbread, 156 Fla. 599, 23 So.2d 761 (1945) and cases cited. For
cases in other states see 129 A.L.R. 255 (1940).
22. Farrington v. Flood, 40 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1949) ; Bass v. Addison, 40 So.2d 466
(Fla. 1949), was decided on the authority of Farrington v. Flood.
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existence. In line with other states, the legislature has also met the pressure
for individual challenge regardless of permission of the state by enacting a
statute which allows a quo warranto proceeding to challenge municipal ex-
istence without consent of the Attorney General.
23
Municipal bonds. The court held that proceeds of a municipal utilities
tax could be used in the payment of paving certificates issued to finance
improvement in paving of streets without a vote of freeholders even though
it stated that under the financing plan the municipality would have no power
to repeal or rescind the ordinance levying the tax.21 The court also validated
certificates of indebtedness to be issued without a vote of freeholders to build
a municipal library. The financing called for the certificates to be paid from
a fund derived solely from a tax levy authorized by state statute on real and
personal property. The court required the plan be modified to make clear
that the city would not be legally obligated to continue the tax in force.25
These cases serve to emphasize previous comment concerning the encroach-
ment on the absolute voting condition contained in the Florida Constitution.2s
PUBLIC CONTRACTS. Award. When contracts are to be let by a public
authority to the "lowest responsible bidder," it is usually held that the
authority has a broad discretion within the limits of good faith and business
practice to choose such bidder. Judicial review of the award cannot be
secured unless the action of the authority is an arbitrary abuse of this dis-
cretion. There is an indication that this rule may not be followed in Florida
and that judicial review will not be limited by such a broad statement.2 7
The court upheld an award of a construction contract by a school board,
but a majority opinion states that the award by the public authority must be
based on "facts reasonably tending to support its conclusions." The opinion
then reviews the facts relied on by the school board to support the award to
the second lowest bidder. This general approach certainly opens up possibili-
ties of obtaining complete court reviews of awards under such statute. Should
the courts go this far in interfering with this type of duty of administrative
officials or bodies? Award of contracts under such statutes appears to involve
23. F.S.A. § 165.30 (1949 Supp.).
24. State v. City of Pensacola, 40 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1949) ; State v. City of Pensacola,
40 So.2d 574 (Fla. 1949) is a similar case.
25. Bessemer Properties, Inc. v. City of Miami, 41 So.2d 551 (Fla. 1949).
26. 3 MlAMI L. Q. 432 and 435 (1949). See also State v. City of Miami, 41 So.2d
545 (Fla. 1949). Three cases dealt with the mechanics of bond elections. In Town of
Baldwin v. State, 40 So.2d 348 (Fla. 1949) the court considered a question concerning
the date for determining the eligibility of freeholders to vote. In State v. Dade County,
39 So.2d 807 (Fla. 1949) and State v. Dade County, 39 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1949), the
court held that a proposal to issue bonds for five different bridges and a proposal for
improvement of three county parks were each single propositions. The respective pro-
posals did not consist of separate and distinct propositions which must be submitted for
vote separately. Tort liability of municipalities was considered in two routine cases.
Bray v. City of Winter Garden, 40 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1949). City of Jacksonville v. Foster,
41 So.2d 548 (Fla. 1949).
27. Culpepper v. Moore, 40 So.2d 366 (Fla. 1949).
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executive duties and little in the way of private right. Since no hearing is
required and the procedure authorized in the award of bids cannot be com-
pared to court procedure in trials, is it desirable to impart the requirement
founded in court procedure as stated in the opinion? In a concurring opinion
Justice Chapman stated the rule first mentioned.
TAXATION. Statutes of Limitations. Two different statutes of limitations
were applied in recent cases. In the first case an heir of the former owner
of land brought suit to cancel tax deeds held by another3 s The original owners
or heirs of the owners had remained in possession of the land from the date
of the tax deeds to the date of the master's report in this case, a period of
ten years. Over nine years after the date of the tax deed the tax deed holder
filed his counterclaim in this suit praying for a decree quieting title in him.
On these facts the court reversed a trial court order dismissing the plaintiff's
bill. The basis for its holding is a statute which provides that a tax deed
holder should not be entitled to possession under the tax deed where the real
estate is in actual adverse possession, unless he brings suit for recovery
within four years from the date of the tax deed. In another case the court
pointed out that under the Florida cases 29 special statutes of limitations for
suits to recover land which has passed to another under tax foreclosure pro-
ceedings do not protect tax titles based on insufficient description.H But the
court refused to apply this rule in a suit of a former owner barred by statute,
where he had knowledge that his property was being sold at public auction,
attended the sale, and failed to bring suit during the statutory period while
the successful bidder obtained the tax title, entered possession, and made
substantial improvements.
Intangibles Tax. Bonds which are secured by Florida property, but are
issued to citizens of other states and held in other states are not taxable.' 1
The court also held that certain claims against the Comptroller for refunds of
taxes paid on such bonds were barred by statute.32
Documentary Stamp Tax. The question of whether leases come within
the documentary stamp tax statute has again been considered by the court.
In 1945, the court held that a 99 year lease was taxable under the documen-
tary stamp tax statute as a written obligation to pay money. 33 In a 1947
case, the court reversed a decree of a lower court dismissing a bill for a
declaration of plaintiff's liability to documentary stamp tax on short term
leases. 34 In a majority opinion in that case it was said the leases were not
28. Palmquist v. Johnson, 41 So.2d 313 (Fla. 1949).
29. Saddler v. Smith, 54 Fla. 671, 45 So. 718 (1908) ; Day v. Benesh 104 Fla. 58,
139 So. 448 (1932).
30. Susman v. Pockrus, 40 So.2d 223 (1949).
31. State ex reL. Tampa Electric Co. v. Gay, 40 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1949).
32. FLA. STATr § 215.26 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
33. Dundee Corp. v. Lee, 24 So.2d 234 (Fla. 1943).
34. DeVore v. Lee, 158 Fla. 608, 30 So.2d 924 (1947).
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taxable as written obligations to pay money, but rather were taxable under
the section covering "deeds, instruments or writings whereby any lands,
tenements, or other realty, or any interest therein, shall be granted, assigned,
transferred, or otherwise conveyed to or vested in the purchaser. .. ." In a
per curiam opinion stating the views of two judges on rehearing it was
further said the taxability of such documents depends on whether the con-
siderations for such instruments are actual monetary considerations or
considerations which have a reasonably determinable monetary value. It was
stated the considerations for the leases in this case did not meet this re-
quirement since they were the lessees promises to pay rent in the future for
future uses. No rent was due or owing when the leases were executed. After
this 1947 appeal, the chanceller then entered a decree for defendant and on
a recent appeal the court reversed this decree, repeating the statements in
the per curiam opinion.3 5 Under this decision taxability will apparently
depend on whether there is any payment made or owing at the time of execu-
tion of the lease. Nothing was decided concerning the measure of tax if
there is such consideration.
CRIMINAL LAw AND PROCEDURE. Right to Counsel. A Florida statute
provides that counsel must be furnished to insolvent defendants in criminal
prosecutions for capital offenses.36 But in all other criminal cases the Florida
Constitution and the Florida statutes do not require the, court to furnish
counsel. 87 In these cases the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution requires counsel to be furnished where the accused is incapable of
representing himself adequately at the trial on account of age, ignorance, lack
of capacity, or any other reason. 3s This incapacity is purely personal and is
to be judged on the basis of the facts in each case. In a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding a circuit court held that petitioner had been capable of adequately
representing himself at two previous trials. The court reviewed the facts
and approved the decision of the circuit court 39 on the ground that it was
supported by competent credible evidence. The opinion states the petitioner
was 30 years of age. He had a formal education of only seven grades, but
had experience as a salesman and as a group director of Civilian Concentration
Canip laborers. He had four previous convictions. His defenses were fully and
completely presented by him in the two Florida trials. In Wade v. Mayo, 40
on the other hand, petitioner was 18 years old and the Federal District Court
found that he was an inexperienced youth unfamiliar with court procedure
and not capable of adequately representing himself.
35. DeVore v. Gay, 39 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1949).
36. FLA. STAT. § 909.21 (1941).
37. Johnson v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 264, 28 So.2d 585 (1946).
38. Betts v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942); Wade v. Mayo, 331 U. S. 801 (1947).
39. Johnson v. Mayo, 40 So.2d 134 (Fla. 1949).
40. See note 38 supra.
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Presence of defendant at trial. A defendant on bail in a criminal trial
(for a crime not a capital offense) was absent the second day of a two day
trial for some reason not appearing on the record. Notwithstanding his absence,
the trial proceeded to judgment. Applying a statute which clearly covers the
case, " the court affirmed the judgment and sentence.4 2
Reasonable doubt. In an appeal from a criminal conviction, a defendant
complained of the failure of the court to instruct the jury that "the defendant
in this case is presumed to be innocent and the presumption remains with him
through every stage of the case until such presumption is removed by credible
evidence, until you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty."
The judge had said in effect that defendant's guilt and every element of guilt
must be proved by evidence which would convince the jury beyond reasonable
doubt that defendant had a presumption of innocence in his favor, and that
he was presumed to be innocent until his guilt was established by evidence be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt, he said, meant substantial doubt
in the sense that the jury could not say they had an abiding conviction to a
moral certainty of the truth of the charge. Since this charge covered the
subject, the court held it was not error to reject the requested charge. After
all, reasonable doubt is just that-reasonable doubt. The addition of the re-
quested charge to the charge given would have emphasized more strongly the
presumption of innocence. This would not have clarified the concept of reason-
able doubt which is difficult to define in any event.
Verdict. A verdict that defendant "is guilty as charged in the informa-
tion" is usually considered responsive to the charge. However, such a verdict
was not considered sufficient by the court in a recent case involving a charge
of violation 6f the beverage law.4 3 A section of this law provides that a
person who has previously been convincted of a violation (a misdemeanor)
will be deemed guilty of a felony upon conviction of a second violation. In this
case involving a second charge the court reversed the judgment of conviction
because the jury must expressly determine the historical fact of the defendant's
former conviction as alleged in the information. In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Barns suggested that the judgment of guilt of the second offense be
affirmed, but that the case be remanded for a separate determination of the
fact of prior conviction-the determination to be by the same jury, another
jury, or by the court. The least technical solution would have been to follow
Justice Hobson's inclination to hold the verdict sufficient and affirm the
judgment, However, he concurred to avoid a dissent in a case when he felt
no one was harmed by the majority ruling. His opinion suggests this is a
41. FLA. STAT. § 914.01 (1941).
42. Mulvey v. State, 41 So.2d 156 (Fla. 1949). Austin v. State, 40 So.2d 896(Fla. 1949).
43. Barnhill v. State, 41 So.2d 329 (Fla. 1949).
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case where the old clich6 applies: it is better to have a definite rule than
to be concerned with the correctness of the rule.
Sentence. Following language in an early case,4 ' the court held that a
defendant in a criminal case could not be fined and also put on probation for
five years with the condition that probation might be vacated at any time
and a sentence imposed which might have been imposed in the first instance. 45
The governing statute provided for fine or imprisonment. The sentence was
said to impose two distinct punishments. As the court also pointed out the
probation statute 46 did not specifically authorize the sentence. This ruling
follows cases in other states where there is no statutory authorization for such
a sentence.
Extradition. Both Federal and Florida extradition statutes 47 provide
that requisition for extradition be supported by indictment, information or
copy of a warrant supported by an affidavit made before a committing
magistrate of the demanding state. In a habeas corpus proceeding brought by
a prisoner being held for extradition, the record showed that a warrant was
issued and an affidavit made before a "clerk" of a district court of
Massachusetts. 48 Neither the documents nor the Massachusetts statutes ex-
amined by the court indicated the clerk was a committing magistrate and the
requisition was held to be insufficient. Thus either the requisition documents
alone or the documents by reference to statutes of the demanding state must
indicate that the person by whom the warrant is issued and before whom
the affidavit is made is a committing magistrate.
Return of evidence to defendant. The court held it was without juris-
diction to entertain an appeal from an order of a Criminal Court of Record
denying a petition of defendant after acquittal for return of money taken
from the defendant on his arrest and offered in evidence at his trial. '9 This
result appears to be consistent with cases in other states although three
judges dissented.50
Search warrants were properly issued by a circuit court judge for search
and seizure of intoxicating liquors, and return was made to the circuit court.
An attempt to recover the liquor seized by a petition for the return of the
property in the county judges court was held not permissible tinder an
applicable statute.5t In response to the petition the county court judge had
entered judgment that unless criminal proceedings were instituted as a result
of the evidence obtained under the warrants he would order the return of
44. Ex porte Williams, 26 Fla. 310, 8 So. 425 (1890).
45. Ex parte Bosso, 41 So.2d 322 (1949).
46. FLA . STAT. § 949.01-949.03 (1941).
47. FLA. STAT. § 941.03, 18 U. S. C. § 3182 (1946 Supp.).
48. State ex reL. Hanowski v. Sullivan, 41 So.2d 338 (Fla. 1949).
49. Jenkins v. State, 41 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1949).
50. Note, 73 L. Ed. 275 at 278-280.
51. Harvey v. Drake, 40 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1949) ; FLA. STAT. § 933.14 (1941).
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the property. A circuit court order denied a writ of prohibition addressed to
the county judge. On appeal the circuit court order was reversed on the
ground that under the statutes governing search warrants and seizure of
intoxicants the property was properly in the custody of the circuit court and
could be disposed of without criminal prosecution unless certain conditions
for return of the property not appearing in this case were met.52
PRIVATE LAW
The opinions of the Supreme Court of Florida published during the
summer show a pattern considerably at variance with the normal one, in
which questions of public law and procedure predominate. Because of the
greater number of private law cases, and because it was necessary for reasons
of space and time to eliminate this section from the last installment of the
QUARTERLY SYNOPSIS, the cases presented here cover a period beginning
and ending at an earlier date than that covered in the previous section, leaving
a number to be carried over to the February issue.'
CONTRACTS. Specialties. In an action on a specialty, such as a construc-
tion bond, it is necessary to prove not only the terms of the obligation, but
also that it has been duly executed. Proof of execution in the case of a specialty
supplies the usual proof of consideration in the case of a less formal contract.
This may be done prima facie by proof of the signature; but such a contract
does not prove itself, as demonstrated in a recent case.2 Where the contract has
been executed by an agent, proof of the authority of the agent must be
offered. In an action on a construction bond, the owner proved that the
bond had been delivered to him by the contractor and offered it in evidence;
but this was held insufficient.
Substantial performance. The rule applicable in building contracts, that,
where there has been substantial completion but the work is not entirely in
compliance with the specifications, the builder may recover the contract price
less damages for his breach, was illustrated in a current case.2 The owner
of the property is entitled to withhold payment of the contract price until the
amount of the damages has been ascertained by agreement or by judicial
52. In Austin v. State, note 42 supra the court held that a trial court had not erred
in denying a motion that the state be required to elect between two counts of the in-
dictment it relied on for a conviction. The motion was made after all the evidence was
in. The counts charged the same offense in different forms.
1. The cases covered are found in Volumes 39 and 40, Southern Reporter (Second
Series), published from March 31, 1949, to July 7, 1949, and representing decisions
entered during February, March, April and May 1949.
2. Lee v. Melvin, 40 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1949).
3. Rivers v. Amara, 40 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1949). The owner brought a bill to cancel
the mortgage, and the builder filed a cross-bill to foreclose. The circuit court adjusted
the amount which the owner was entitled to withhold offset and ordered foreclosure for
the balance, with costs and attorneys' fees. The supreme court held that the owner was
entitled to a reasonable time after the determination of the balance due in which to
bring his payments current.
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action. In the meantime, he is not in default. In a case where the owner of
land gave the builder a mortgage, it was held that the builder could not fore-
close so long as he had not completed the building in accordance with the
contract and the amount of damages had not been adjusted by agreement.
The equitable policy that a breach of contract must be substantial to
excuse nonperformance also finds expression in the rule that where one party
has an option to terminate a contract for any default on the part of the
other, the conditions under which the option may be exercised will be
strictly construed. In a contract to purchase fruit on the tree, the buyer
reserved an option to terminate if any part of the crop should be materially
damaged by storm. The supreme court sustained a charge that the buyer
must show that such a substantial amount of the whole crop had been damaged
as to render the entire crop unmerchantable or impractical to handle. 4 The
ruling in this case, as well as the ruling in the previous one, shows applications
in law of the equitable policy to prevent penalties and forfeitures.
In another case 6 the court reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence to
support proof of an oral contract of sale.
Implied wvarranty that food is safe. It was also established during the
quarter that a restaurateur, who does not sell food but service, or "utters
victuals" in the language of the common law, impliedly warrants that the
food is safe for human consumption.6 The case has already received extended
comment in this publication.7 It should be noted that as a result of this case
and other recent authority,8 persons sustaining injury as the result of impure
food products may, if there is privity of contract with the maker, mediately
or immediately through a retailer, have an election to sue in contract for
breach of implied warranty or in tort for negligence. Persons unable to show
a contractual relationship must have recourse to an action based upon
negligence. This distinction proves to be one of form only, because, through
invocation of the rule of res ipsa loquitur, the happening of the injury is
4. Purpura Bros., Inc. v. Oxner, 40 So.2d 890 (Fla. 1949). The facts are found
in a dissenting opinion. The evidence showed that the first day's picking was unmer-
chantable, which was some evidence to show that the entire crop was unmerchantable;
but the burden of proof was properly on the buyer.
5. White v. E. Levy & Sons, 40 So.2d 142 (Fla. 1949). Showcases were leased by
landlord to tenant of a store upon an oral contract in which the landlord reserved the
right to sell the cases and refund unearned rent. There was evidence to show that the
price was established and that the tenant agreed to pay it. There was also contradictory
evidence on each particular. Held, that since the evidence supported the verdict, it was
error to grant a new trial.
6. Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949).
7. 3 MIAMI L. Q. 638 (1949).
8. Starke Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Carlington, 159 Fla. 718, 32 So.2d 583 (1947),
noted I U. oF FLA. L. REv. 470 (1948). It is possible that this last case rests on some
fine distinction between injury from glass or other foreign substance in the beverage
and injury from an exploding container. The implied warranty would thus extend to
the wholesomeness of the food, but not to the suitability of the package for preparation
or service. The cases make no such distinction. See generally, Comment, 3 MIAMI L. Q
613 (1949).
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prima facie proof of negligence. Specific proof to rebut the presumption of
negligence may be offered in tort cases, while no similar defense is available
when the injured party elects to sue in contract.
Some considerable confusion has occurred in the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to these cases. If the process of preparing the
food is exclusively within the control of the producer, it would seem to
satisfy the rule, as it was originally applied in cases of the operation of
machinery, that the instrumentality must be in the sole control of the de-
fendant; but the Supreme Court of Florida had apparently transferred the
rule from the process of production to the product itself, stating that it must
be shown that the product has not been handled by others since it left the
hands of the manufacturer.9 It would be more correct to say that in any
case where the product is no longer in the hands of the manufacturer, the
evidence must reasonably exclude the possibility of some intervening cause.
If it meets this test, then res ipsa loquitur applies to the manufacturing
process. That rule finds expression in a current case in which a bottled
carbonated beverage exploded while being handled by a retailer's servant.10
Waiving the tort, In an action to recover for the conversion of personal
property, the owner may elect to waive the tort and sue in assumpsit for goods
bargained and sold. If he fails to prove his case in assumpsit, he cannot try
his luck again in tort: he has made his election and the matter is res
judicata. A recent decision 1 ' makes it clear that where there is no final
decision on the merits, the plaintiff will not be treated as having made a
binding election. In a contract case the court entered a directed verdict
because it found that the plaintiff had mistaken his remedy. Presumably this
ruling would have been reversed on appeal, but plaintiff chose instead to
follow the circuit judge's advice and sue in tort. Defendant's contention
that the case was res judicata was overruled in both courts.
IEAL PROPERTY. StrJace water. An upper riparian owner is privileged
9. Compare Comment, 3 MIA-.t L. Q. 613, 619 (1949) with Case Comment. I U.
oF FLA. L. REv. 470 (1948). The editor in the latter classifies the rule in Starke Bottling
Co. v. Carlington, 159 Fla. 718, 32 So.2d 583 (1947), as the "non-possessory extension"
of the res ipsa loquitter rule.
10. Groves v. Florida Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 40 So.2d 128, 130 (Fla. 1949).
Sebring, J.: "When such evidence has been produced a prima facie case of negligence
has been established sufficient to place the burden on the manufacturer of rebutting the
presumption raised by the evidence that the explosion was the result of some defect in
the bottle, improper charging or mixing of its contents, or negligent manner in its
handling while in the possession and control of the manufacturer." A waitress employed
in a restaurant was injured while placing a bottle in the refrigerator. The bottle, which
exploded in her hands, had just been taken from a case in the storeroom where it had
been stacked the day before by an employee of the bottling company.
11. Kent v. Sutker, 40 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1949). Sutker delivered jewelry to Kent
upon a memorandum receipt showing that the transaction was "for examination and
inspection only." The jewelry was not returned, and Sutker instituted an action for
goods bargained and sold. In the subsequent case there were counts both in contract
and in tort. As to the counts in contract, it would seem that the matter was adjudicated
in the first case and not subject to collateral attack; but this was at least harmless error
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to discharge surface water accumulating on his premises into a stream which
normally drains them. This privilege must be distinguished from that which
an owner has to drain surface water over the land of neighbors where it
follows the slope of the land but does not course through a well-defined
stream. The law has grown around this distinction, permitting acceleration of
the flow of surface water through ditches and sewers when it is discharged
into a natural stream,' but holding the higher owner liable in damages for
an unreasonable discharge where there is no stream. Frequently courts
confuse the two lines of authority and hold an upper riparian owner liable
for an unreasonably heavy discharge into an existing watercourse.'? That
Florida makes the orthodox distinction is illustrated by a current case 18
in which the decisions under both rules are reviewed and distinguished. It
is also made clear that a municipal corporation is regarded as a riparian
owner with rights and duties like those of an individual.
Right to possession. The state constitution preserves the right to trial
by jury and vests in the circuit courts exclusive original jurisdiction in
ejectment proceedings.1 ' As a result, while a bill to quiet title may be brought
in equity in situations which were not within the jurisdiction of equity before
it was enlarged by statute, there must be a trial by jury of the question of
title whenever rights are asserted against a person in possession of land.1r
A recent case 16 makes it clear that this applies not only where the equity
in the bill is exclusively quia timet, but also where it is based on some inde-
pendent equity, such as that possession was obtained by. fraud. According
to another case, 17 the same rule applies where a cross bill is filed or equitable
defense asserted against a plaintiff in possession, although title is not in
dispute. t6
Landlord and tenant. Prior to the development of the writ of ejectment
in the reign of Henry III, the law regarded a term for years as a personal
contract between the landlord and tenant, and not as an interest in property.
If ejected by a third party, the tenant's oniy remedy was an action of covenant
against the landlord for damages. Under the writ of ejectment, he could
assert rights in rem, and therefore a leasehold has become an interest in land,
12. BuY, HAmBoOK OF THz LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 66 (1943).
13. Bray v. Winter Garden, 40 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1949). The plaintiff also alleged
pollution, but the evidence failed to prove the allegation.
14. FLA. CONST. DECLARATION OF RicTS, § 3; Art. V, § 11.
15. For history of statutes regulating proceedings to quiet title to land, see J. M.
Flowers, Florida Real Property Laws of 1947, 2 MIAMi L. Q. 21, 22 (1947).
16. Cox v. Lippard, 40 So.2d 219 (Fla. 1949).
17. Hull v. Toppino, 40 So.2d 137 (Fla. 1949). A landlord, having obtained pos-
session of leased premises, sued to hold his dispossessed tenant as trustee of the liquor
license. The tenant filed a cross bill, challenging the landlord's right to possession. This
was transferred to the law side. A defense challenging illegal use of process was dis-
missed, apparently under the rule of res judicata.
18. Id. The court directed that the case be transferred to the law side, and that
the issues in ejectment be framed and submitted to a jury.
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although said to be less than freehold, and a lease is regarded as a conveyance.
Likewise the agreement to pay rent became an incident of the reversion,
and might be enforced against an assignee without a specific assumption
since it was a charge on the land. 9 This is no longer true in Florida, ac-
cording to a recent decision. 20 While a lease is a conveyance, the covenant
to pay rent is a mere executory contract, having no present value. The
decision is explained by special considerations in tax cases,21 but we have
already noted a similar holding where taxes were not involved.2 2 For other
purposes, a lease remains an executory contract only until possession is taken,
which may be accomplished by the attornment of a tenant in possession.23
PERSONAL PROPERTY. Replevin. So much of the law of personal property
is explained by the history of the development of the possessory writs that it
is often impossible to distinguish between substantive and procedural ques-
tions in dealing with possessory actions. In accord with centuries of tradition,
the plaintiff in replevin receives possession of the property summarily, and
the action is one in which the nominal defendant is for all practical purposes
an actual plaintiff in an action for tortious taking. The statutes afford the
defendant an opportunity to avoid summary restitution to the plaintiff by
posting a counter bond; but where he does not do so, the very judicial de-
cision that the defendant was entitled to possession defeats his actual
possession. This is demonstrated in a recent case,24 which also shows that
it is the right to possess, not ownership, that is litigated. Where personal
property is seized in the hands of a sheriff, who holds possession under a
writ of execution, the judgment on the replevin bond should run in favor
of the sheriff, not the judgment creditor, presumably leaving the sheriff
liable to the latter on his bond. It is not surprising, therefore, that in another
current case,2 5 discussed below, the court held that these cumbersome pro-
ceedings could not be deemed an adequate remedy at law.
SECURITY TRANSACTIONS. Pledges. Where a pledgee converts the security
by transferring it to a third party, the pledgor may recover the pledge in an
action of replevin if he tenders the amount which he owes, or he may recover
the net value of the pledge in an action for damages. In a recent case in-
volving replevin of a ring pledged to one, Watson, and by him transferred
19. BuiuY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PRORTY 142 (1Q43).
20. DeVore v. Gay, 39 So.2d 796 (Fla. 1949).
21. Barns, J.: "Laws imposing taxes should be liberally construed for the tax-
payers." Id. at 797.
22. See comments on Marks v. Fields, 36 So.2d 612 (Fla- 1948) in Synopsis,
3 MIAMI L. Q. 44 (1948).
23. Taradash v. Supreme Development Corp., 40 So.2d 577 (Fla. 1949). Tenant
reserved the express right to terminate the lease if possession could not be given within
a fixed period, the landlord's right to recover possession being abridged by wartime rent
controls. Thereafter tenant received rent from the person in possession and continued
to do so for almost a year before bringing a bill to cancel.
24. Bryant v. Godfrey, 40 So.2d 833 (Fla. 1949).
25. See Miami Beach First National Bank v. Harney, 39 So.2d 789, Note 29, iinfra.
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to one, Gourlie, evidence of actual notice of the pledge given Gourlie at the
time by the owner was excluded under the rule excluding testimony of a
party where the other is dead. 0 'I n reversing a directed verdict for defendant,
the higher court ruled that the pledgor's title was not defeasible by transfer,
even to a purchaser for value without notice. 27 It should be noted, however,
that a pledge usually carries authority to sell if the debt is not paid when due,
the pledgor recovering any surplus realized in an action against the pledgee ; 25
but the pledge in this case was transferred "shortly thereafter."
In another case, a bill was brought in equity to prevent the sale of shares
of corporate stock, assigned to a bank to secure payment of a note, which
the plaintiff alleged was paid. The bill contained no allegation that the stock
was unique. A motion to dismiss was grounded on the adequacy of the
remedy at law. With respect to pledges of personal property, the common
law afforded two remedies: specific restitution on tender of the amount due
in replevin, and damages for the value of the equity of redemption in trover.29
It is believed that the Supreme Court of Florida has now given concurrent
jurisdiction to equity over a field formerly served adequately by law.
Mortgages. The right to foreclose may not be asserted by a mortgagee
who is himself in default, the proceeding being in equity. If the mortgagee's
default bears no relation to the mortgagor's, the court may make such orders
as are consistent with the equities and proceed with foreclosure; but when
the mortgagee's default excuses nonperformance by the mortgagor, it is
necessary after making appropriate orders with respect to the mortgagee's
default, to give the mortgagor a reasonable time in which to perform his
part of the agreement. It is not necessary to dismiss the proceeding; the
court will retain jurisdiction until that time has passed.2 0
Another case2 makes it clear that the emergency legislation which
26. Richardson v. Gourlie, 40 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1949). Richardson pledged a diamond
ring with Watson, an attorney, for an unpaid fee. With Richardson's knowledge, Watson
gave the ring to Gourlie, who gave it to his wife. More than ten years elapsed before
Richardson brought suit against Mrs. Gourlie, paying the principal sum, but not interest,
into the registry of the court. This latter factor was not discussed. Dissenting judges
expressed the opinion that the error was immaterial since the statute of limitations had
run; but on that issue, the burden was with the defendant and the order reviewed was
a directed verdict for the defendant. Accordingly, that issue could be retried on the
remand.
27. The court characterized this as the rule of caveat emptor, which we think ap-
plicable only to implied warranties of quality.
28. See Pardo v. Evans-Lakeland, 38 So.2d 307 (Fla. 1949), discussed in Synopsis,
3 MIAMI L. Q. 438 (1949).
29. Miami Beach First National Bank v. Harney, 39 So.2d 789 (Fla. 1949). The
facts are taken from the dissenting opinion of Sebring, J.
30. Rivers v. Amara, 40 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1949). A builder, who failed to complete
a building in accordance with the contract, asked foreclosure of a construction mortgage.
The circuit court deducted the amount of the owner's damages and ordered foreclosure
with costs.
31. Buckland v. Lewis State Bank, 39 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1949). The bank took a
second mortgage for $1900, scaling down the indebtedness to that extent. Whether or
not the scaling down was without consideration, was not raised by the bank.
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established the Home Owners' Loan Corporation was not enacted as an
exemption statute to protect home owners as a class, but rather to protect
the public interest in a sound banking systemY2 It enabled banks, building
and loan associations, insurance companies and other lending agencies to
exchange undersecured mortgages for more liquid assets. The defendant in
foreclosure asserted that when a state bank received a guaranteed first
mortgage for $4,000 in exchange for one of $6,000, a second mortgage for
the balance was exacted in violation of the policy of the federal statute and
was void. Another of the myths upon which Statism has traded so long for
popular support has thus been exploded.
EQUITY. Reformation. It is often stated that equity will not reform a
contract or conveyance to correct a mistake of law, however mutual; but
the fallacy of such a conclusion is illustrated in one line of cases. In the
construction of a deed, the parol evidence rule excludes evidence of the
intent of the parties, and looks only to the terms of the instrument, unless
there is an ambiguity. Often the court, as in a recent case,33 finds an
ambiguity and admits parol evidence for the sole purpose of carrying out
the intent of the parties which they have failed to express, and in effect
relieves them from.a mistake of law as to the interpretation of their contract.
In the principal case the court found and enforced the grant of an easement
on parol evidence of the intent of the parties.
In another case 3 4 the court insisted, apparently for the purpose of dis-
tinguishing between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law, that the evidence
must show specifically wherein the mistake lay. The buyer opened the negotia-
tions, representing that the seller had acquired at a tax sale certain land which
separated the buyer's home from a street, and the seller, as an accommodation,
conveyed the land acquired at the tax sale to the buyer. The buyer obtained
title to more than was contemplated. It was not shown, however, whethet
the seller was mistaken as to the content of the deed which he signed
believing the description to be different from that which the deed actually
contained, which would be a mistake of fact, or whether he was mistaken as
32. Any other interpretation of the federal statute would be unconstitutional as
class legislation according to the principles announced in Liquor Store, Inc. v. Con-
tinental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949), discussed in Synopsis, 3 MIAMI
L. Q. 593.
33. Boothby v. Gulf Properties of Alabama, 40 So.2d 117 (Fla. 1949). Plaintiffs,
claimed an easement in beach frontage lying between lots and the gulf which they pur-
chased of the defendant. This was based on the words "Beach Reserved" appearing or
the plat, and the oral declarations of the agents of the seller that that meant (i.e., in law)
that this area was reserved for all the purchasers of lots as a public beach, or common.
"Reserved" as a word of art means that an interest is not included in a conveyance,
and is inappropriate to convey an interest to a grantee.
34. Robertson v. Capital Finance Corp., 40 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1949). The buyer shocked
the court by taking oppressive action against the other landowners, poor negroes, whose
title he thus acquired. it is safe to predict that some way will be found to protect their
interests.
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to the effect of both his deed and the tax deed, which would be a mistake of
law. Actually it should not make any difference.
To justify reformation of a contract, mistake should be mutual; but where
one party is mistaken and the other party knows of the mistake but inten-
tionally takes advantage of it, nmtuality is dispensed with. It is not necessary
to show actual misrepresentation amounting to fraud: mere silence is sufficient,
as shown in a recent case.8 5
Enjorcement of legal rights in equity. When an instrument has
been reformed, equity will enforce it although there may be an adequate
remedy at law, because equity does not do justice by halves. The distinction
is preserved, however, between those rights which are equitable and those
which are legal. In a current case s a bill was brought to reform certain notes
which were the obligation of a dissolved corporation, but which had been
represented to be the notes of an individual. The plaintiff asserted the de-
fendant's fraud to show that the claim was not barred by laches; but the court
held that since action on the notes as reformed would be barred by the
statute of limitations, it would not reform the notes.
Fraudulent conveyances. There is a traditional confusion between a
creditor's bill to reach equitable assets and a creditor's bill to set aside
fraudulent conveyances, both of which are commonly called "creditors'
bills." 37 The first may be prosecuted only when the claim has been reduced.
to judgment.8 8 The latter, resting upon an independent equity, is not subject
to this limitation. A recent case shows that Florida recognizes the distinc-
tion.,3 A corporation, planning dissolution, contracted to sell its principal asset,
a cafeteria. Instead of taking title to the business, the purchasers acquired
the outstanding stock, agreeing to pay the broker's commission. The broker
brought a creditor's bill against the corporation and its stockholders, which
was dismissed because it was not alleged that suit had been instituted in law.
This order was reversed. Unless the supreme court disregards the corporate
fiction in all cases where there is a voluntary liquidation, the case broadens
the scope of fraudulent transfers to include all transfers made with intent to
defraud the creditors of another, in this case, the corporation's.
Resulting and constructive trusts. There is a presumption that a trust
does not result to a husband who purchases real property and takes title in
the name of his wife, the act of the husband being more consistent with an
35. Robertson v. Capital Finance Corp., 40 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1949). In a bill to
cancil a deed, it was shown that the purchaser and seller negotiated for the purchase
of a sin~le tract but the deed when delivered covered more. From the purchaser's
conduct immediately after receiving the deed, knowledge throughout of the seller's
mistake might have been inferred.
36. Syerson v. Kimball, 40 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1949).
37. CtARx, SUMMARY OF AME.ICAN LAw 391 (1947).
38. By statute, Florida permits the suit to be filed. but requires judgment to be
entered at law before there are further proceedings. FLA. STAT. § 62.37 (1941).39. Megdalt v. Scott Corp., 40 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1949).
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intent to make a gift than an intent to reserve a beneficial interest. It was con-
tended in a recent case40 that this rule should not apply when, at the time ot
the purchase, the wife had sued the husband for divorce and had dismissed the
suit upon a property settlement. The presumption of gift is said to be re-
buttable, but what evidence would be sufficient to rebut it is not shown. The
presumption does not apply when a wife purchases real property in the hus-
band's name, but a current case 41 tends the other way. A woman delivered
merchandise to her former husband to establish him in a business similar to
her own, in which he had helped her prior to the end of their joint venture.
The court ruled that in the absence of a specific contract to pay, the law
would not imply one in view of the relationship of the parties.
We have formerly noted the existence of a fiduciary relationship between
tenants in common, which causes one purchasing at a tax sale to hold the title
acquired upon constructive trust for the others.42 Whether or not that right
may be asserted by a cotenant who refuses when solicited to pay his share of
the taxes was avoided in a recent case. 43 After the sale the defaulting co-
tenant quitclaimed to the purchasing cotenant. This was held sufficient to
determine his right to enforce a constructive trust.
Equal equities. The recording statutes do not protect equitable titles.
One who purchases from a person who does not have legal title acquires
a mere equitable right subject to prior equities. A cotenant whose title to
land had been divested by a tax sale was entitled to proceed in equity against
a cotenant who purchased at the tax sale. This equity he released by a deed
of quitclaim. Before the deed was recorded, he quitclaimed to another who
brought a bill to enforce the constructive trust, The court held that the subse-
quent purchaser of the equity, although first to record, took nothing.44
WILLS. Probate proceedings, Every attorney whose practice includes the
frequent drafting of wills dreams of the will, executed in his office with all
the formality that a prosperous client could afford, which turns up after
testator's death without a signature. It happens occasionally; but when it
does, the will cannot be admitted to probate, even if three subscribing wit-
nesses testify that the testator declared it to be his will in their presence and
that they were all under the impression that he had signed it.46 An old prob-
lem, whether a bill to probate one will may be joined with a petition to revoke
probate of another, has been answered in the affirmative, two judges hesi-
40. Lieber v. Lieber, 40 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1949). The husband failed to prove, al-
though he alleged, an express oral agreement to rebut the presumption. As to this
point, see Synopsis, 2 MIAMI L. Q. 325 (1948), and 3 MIAMI L. Q. 441 (1949).
41. Parker v. Priestley, 39 So.2d 210 (Fla. 1949).
42. See Synops is, 3 MIAMI L. Q. 47 (1948).
43. Nelson v. Sullivan, 40 So.2d 114 (Fla. 1949).
44. Ibid.
45. In re Neil's Estate, 39 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1949). What actually happened is left
to the reader's imagination by the opinion.
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tating. 40 Probate of a will later in date has the effect of revoking an earlier
will already probated, at least to the extent of inconsistencies; but an earlier
will cannot be admitted to probate until a later, already probated, has been
successfully contested.4 7 It is therefore often held in the latter type of case
that petitions cannot be joined, but this view fails to take advantage of the
flexibility of proceedings in equity. Another troublesome question has been
settled by a holding that an executor named in an earlier will does not have
a sufficient interest to contest the probate of a later will.4S That duty devolves
upon the legatees, unless the executor must serve as a trustee to represent
some future interests.
An administrator de bonis non cnto lestamento annexo, however, has
a sufficient interest to demand an accounting by a retiring executor. 49 It is
sometimes forgotten, as it was by the circuit judge in the same case, that a
trustee or executor has a duty to inform the beneficiaries of the status of his
trust at all times, and a bill for an accounting is based on this duty and not
on a showing that the fiduciary has committed a breach of trust. Furthermore,
the circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the county judges in
actions for an accounting by an administrator de bonis non against his prede-
cessor.
Claims. The decisive measure of proof required to establish a claim
against a decedent's estate is discussed in a current case.5 0 It was proved
beyond question that his divorced former wife delivered merchandise to de-
cedent to help him start a business similar to one in which she was engaged.
The proof failed to show a promise to pay. Because of the relationship, the
court found it impossible to say that a promise to pay was implied, and ruled
that the evidence did not support a finding in favor of the claimant.
The statute which excludes testimony of a party to an action against
the personal representative, descendant or other successor of a decedent,
concerning any transaction or communication with the decedent, was con-
strued not to apply to an action of replevin against one claiming by an inter
vivos gift from a person now deceased.5'
Construction: misnomer and cy pres. Where testator leaves property to
a charitable corporation, and the corporation is dissolved before his death,
there is considerable disagreement in the cases whether the gift lapses or
may be preserved under cy pres. Where the gift is made to a charitable cor-
poration in trust for certain purposes within its corporate powers, and the
46. In re Barret's Estate, 40 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1949).
47. The difficulty is usually to determine whether a later will may be offered for
probate after it is too late to contest probate of the former. SIMES, PROBLEMS IN PROBATE
LAW (1946), p. 101.
48. In re Barret's Estate, 40 So.2d 125 (Fla. 1949).
49. Koelliker v. Jenkins, 40 So.2d 358 (Fla. 1949).
50. Parker v. Priestley, 39 So.2d 210 (Fla. 1949). See note 41, supra.
51. Richardson v. Gourlie, 40 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1949). Two judges dissented.
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corporation is dissolved prior to testator's death, a new trustee will be ap-
pointed under the rule that equity will not permit a trust to fail for want of
a trustee. If the selection of charitable purposes was left to the corporation,
the courts will permit the successor to suggest other purposes in the exercise
of the cy pres power. The cases which hold that a gift to a charitable corpora-
tion lapses are based on the theory that no trust is intended, while those
which support it are based upon a view that, since a charitable corporation is
a trust in a specialized form, all gifts to the corporation are gifts to the
trustees for the corporate purposes. Cases of the first type draw from New
York where, prior to the Tilden Act, gifts in trust for charity were held void
for want of definite beneficiaries, but gifts to charitable corporations, if not
specifically in trust, were held valid. 2 Florida has chosen to recognize the
gift to a corporation as one in trust, which enables the courts to appoint a
successor and to define the charitable purposes tinder cy pres, according to
a recent case.53 The case might have been disposed of much more easily as
one of misnomer, as the court recognized in a concluding sentence.
FAMILY LAw. Children. The question as to whether or not the presence
of a child within the jurisdiction is necessary to enable a court to make an
order awarding custody was raised in a recent case." The parents were
divorced in Alabama, but the child was, and had been for some time, in the
custody of maternal grandparents in Florida. The father, having obtained a
decree awarding custody to him, petitioned in Florida for habeas corpus. By
applying the rule that a custody decree rendered elsewhere is subject to
modification in this state, 55 the court was able to dispose of the case without
discussing the validity of the original decree.
The factors to be considered in awarding custody of children were dis-
cussed in two cases. In each, a parent sought to obtain custody from grand-
parents on the side of the other spouse. In one, 56 the court preferred the
mother to the paternal grandmother where the mother's home offered cer-
tain advantages; but in the other," the father, a nonresident who scarcely
knew the child, lost to a grandmother who had had seven years' custody
continuing almost from birth, the relative homes being more or less equal.
Each case is thus apparently made to stand on its own merits, with the wel-
fare of the child controlling.
The right to visit children should never be denied in a divorce decree
52. See St. Joseph's Hospital v. Bennett, 281 N. Y. 115, 22 N. E.2d 305 (1939).
53. Christian Herald Association; Inc. v. First National Bank of Tampa, 40 So.2d
563 (Fla. 1949).
54. Little v. Franklin, 40 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1949).
55. See Eddy v. Stauffer, 37 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1948) discussed in Synopsis, 3 MiAm
L. Q. 279 (1949).
56. Dobbs v. Kelly, 39 So.2d 479 (Fla. 1949). The child was actually in the custody
of the father, but he was required while working to leave the child with grandparents.
The child, a boy, was only four.
57. Little v. Franklin, 40 So.2d 768 (Fla. 1949).
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so long as the parent does not prejudice the morals or welfare of the children
by improper conduct in their presence.5 s
The threat to the future welfare of children which the broken home
betokens was poignantly brought to the court's attention in another case.' 9
It was necessary to sustain a conviction for murder, with a death sentence,
in the case of a youth of eighteen whose childhood had been blighted by
parental neglect. The court took time to reflect, not without some remarkable
Terrellisms,0 0 how much more appropriate it might be to visit punishment
upon the parents, who were safely beyond the jurisdiction of the court.
Married women's emancipation. In a current decision, 6 the Supreme
Court of Florida construed the Emancipation Act of 1943 02 to permit a
married woman to become jointly liable with her husband as surety for the
debts of a third person. Husband and wife executed a written contract of
guarantee for a corporation in which the family appears to have been inter-
ested. The wife pleaded the constitutional prohibition against subjecting a
married woman's separate property to the payment of her husband's debts; 08
but the court pointed out that it was the corporation's, not the husband's,
debt which was guaranteed. Since the corporation bore the husband's sur-
name, one wonders whether the defense was not based on identity of the
corporation and the husband; but the case arose on a certified question and
the whole record was not before the court.
Homestead property. Homestead property may be conveyed away by
the head of the family during his life. Since deeds may now be made between
husband and wife, it is possible that a husband may defeat the statute relating
to descent of homestead property by a conveyance to his wife. It has now
been established 04 that a conveyance made prior to marriage will defeat the
claims of children by a former marriage. The homestead character of real
property may also be destroyed by a divorce decree, ordering a sale and
division of the proceeds 6 5
Infancy. The right of an infant to repudiate a contract to purchase items
not necessary for his maintenance is recognized in this state; but, according
58. Yandell v, Yandell, 39 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1949).
59. Hatton v. State, 39 So.2d 713 (Fla. 1949).
60. "Society has evolved a code of ethics that those who travel roughshod over
others be required to stew in their own juice." Hatton v, State, 39 So.2d 713, 714 (Fla.
1949).
61. Continental Can Inc., v. Lee Inc., 40 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1949).
62. C. 21939, Acts of 1943; FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1943 Supp.).
63. FLA. CONST. Art. XI, § 1.
64. Scoville v. Scoville, 40 So.2d 840 (Fla. 1949). The case is of especial interest
to the editor because it is the first in which the court has noticed judicially, actually in
advance of publication, one of the Florida law reviews. The kydos goes to our rival.
65. Olsen v. Simpson, 39 So.2d 801 (Fla. 1949). On divorce, the parties, who had
held as tenants by the entireties, were decreed tenants in common. The property was
sold on partition proceedings instituted by the wife, who attached the husband's share
of the proceeds as a creditor. It was held that the husband, being still the head of a
family, was entitled to assert the personal property exemption.
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to a current case, 6 the right may be lost if the minor has misrepresented his
age. We have already noted a tendency to apply equitable defenses when
personal incapacity is asserted by a married woman, enforcing a defective
contract on the equity of part performance. 67 In going against the "weight of
authority" 6- in the current case, the supreme court recognizes the fact that
these statutes are intended to protect minors from designing persons, and not
to increase the danger to the public of designing minors.
Grounds for divorce. Those who look with horror upon "easy Florida
divorces" will find something to ponder in recent cases which demonstrate
extensively that nagging is not a ground for divorce in this state, unless so
persistent that the husband's health is impaired.69 Loss of thirty pounds is
no proof of impaired health when the residual weight exceeds two hundred,
nor does it help to show that the husband was forced to take up his abode
elsewhere if he goes to live with an attractive blonde with whom he was
previously acquainted.' 0 Where a wife nursed her wrath to the point that
she refused to visit a husband stricken with coronary thrombosis, she ex-
ceeded the limit of tolerance.71 This rule is further enforced by the applica-
tion of another, that a divorce will not be granted on the uncorroborated
testimony of the plaintiff complainant.7 2 On the other hand, philandering to
the extent that the sensibilities of the wife are shocked and she suffers in
mind and body, may afford grounds to the wife.73
Alimony and property settlements. The amount of alimony or property
settlement is left to the discretion of the chancellor in divorce cases: the
supreme court will intervene only when it is shown that discretion has been
abused.7 4 Lump sum alimony should not be granted, however, where the
amount is based upon the husband's earning capacity, and immediate payment
would impair the capital needed in the conduct of his business.75 A statute
forbids the award of alimony where a wife is found guilty of adultery, but
66. Brenner v. Perlman, 40 So.2d 901 (Fla. 1949). The minor attempted to rescind
the purchase of an automobile.
67. See Baker v. Rice, 37 So.2d 837 (Fla. 1948) noted in Synopsis, 3 MIAMx L. Q.
292 (1949),
68. CLARK, SUMMARY Op AMERICAN LAW 152 (1947). The author points out,
however, that in those jurisdictions the minor may be liable in tort for his fraud, which
leads to the same result.
69. Harmon v. Harmon, 40 So.2d 209 (Fla. 1949). Husband, an airline pilot, con-
tinued able to pass the frequent and rigorous physical examinations required of his
profession.
70. Morgan v. Morgan, 40 So.2d 778 (Fla. 1949).
71. Lieber v. Lieber, 40 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1949).
72. See note 70, supra. It may be difficult to determine whose story the corroborating
evidence supports. "The female of the specie homo is as quick as a spider to sense another
woman in the domestic web," Terrell, J.
73. See note 69, supro.
74. Bouchez v. Bouchez, 39 So2d 286 (Fla. 1949). Held, not error to divide the
proceeds of the sale of a homestead, where the wife was 54, husband 67, and there were
no children.
75. Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1949); Rubinow v. Rubinow, 40 So.2d
561 (Fla. 1949).
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this does not prohibit the allowance of a settlement or of attorney's fees3 8
It is error not to grant a settlement to an adulterous wife, where she has
contributed through the years to the acquisition of her husband's property."
A hunp sum award of alimony is subject to review and modification upon
a showing that conditions have changed. Ai agreement or stipulation between
the parties not to apply for modification, being against public policy, will
not bar an application for an increased allowance.7
Corporations. Receivership of a corporation, either temporary or perma-
nent. should not be granted unless it appears that corporation assets will be
lost or fraudulently transferred. A receivership is attended with heavy charges
and expenses, and should not he used, especially as a temporary measure,
when the court can preserve the status quo by injunction or other appropriate
orders pending inquiry. This rule was illustrated in a recent case7 9 where a
non-voting stockholder charged the principal stockholder with intentionally
"freezing out" the non-voting stockholder. Neither the corporation nor the
defendant stockholder were alleged to be insolvent: in fact, the latter was
said to be "incredibly wealthy."
Evidence sufficient to show that corporate directors engaged on their
own account in the same business as the corporation, circumstances in which
the directors would doubtless be liable as constructive trustees, was found
to be lacking in another case., " To the liability as trustees which the directors
of a corporation must carry for three years after dissolution may be added
a new one. It has been held that they are not liable to suit, but that an equi-
table attachment can be levied against them. If, however, they know of an
outstanding claim at the time of dissolution, they may le liable as constructive
trustees in an original bill.8'
TORTS. Wrongful death. When one person has been killed through the
tortious act of another, the dependents of the decedent have a cause of action
against the tortfeasor in their own right for loss of support. This cause of
action is to be distinguished from the right of the decedent to sue for his own
damages, including loss of earnings, expenses, and pain and suffering. This
right was extinguished on death at common law, but survives to his personal
representative for the use of dependents under statutes in many states. In
Florida, the right of the dependents to sue is governed by statute,8 2 and a
general statute8 3 provides for the survival of all causes of action, with certain
76. Foreman v. Foreman, 40 So.2d 560 (Fla. 1949).
77. Ibid.
78. Haynes v. Haynes, 40 So.2d 123 (Fla. 1949).
79. McAllister Hotel Inc. v. Schatzberg, 40 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1949). On certiorari,
the court quashed an order granting a temporary receivership. Through a managerial
contract with and loans from another corporation which he controlled, the principal
stockholder was charged with diverting profits.
80. Blanchard v. McCord, 40 So.2d 457 (Fla. 1949).
81. Megdall v. Scott Corp., 40 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1949).
82. FLA. STATS. §§ 768.01-.02 (1941).
83. FLA. STATS. § 45.11 (1941).
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exceptions, to the personal representative. Because there are two different
causes of action, recovery or failure to recover in one has no effect upon the
other by the view generally held in this country. 4 While recognizing that
there are two separate causes of action, our court has taken the view that
an adverse decision in an action brought by a widow in her own right will
bar recovery by estoppel in an action brought by the widow as personal
representative.8
Negligence. In a case"4 in which a verdict was directed for the defendant,
arising out of an accident in which a child was hurt crossing a street at the
corner, the court held that the fact that the accident took place at a place
where pedestrians have the right of way was some evidence to prove negli-
gence, sufficient to require the case to he submitted to a jury. The quantum
of evidence necessary to support a verdict against a municipal hospital for
negligently administering harmful drugs is discussed in another case. 7 It
is made very plain in a number of cases 88 that the function of a court in
reviewing a negligence case is not to determine whether the evidence is more
consistent with a recovery than not, but whether there is adequate evidence,
disregarding all to the contrary, to support the verdict.
Res ipsa loquitur in food cases. A current decision in which the applica-
tion of the rule of res ipsa loquitur in an exploding bottle case was discussed
has been treated above under Contracts (Implied Warranties).80
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION. Coverage. Current decisions relating to
the scope of the act show that horse trainers are entitled to the benefits of
the act, not being classed as athletes and their trainers, who are excepted.90
A foreign corporation which employs more than three persons, but only two
within this state, is subject to the provisions of the act with respect to those
employed locally.0 1 A husband who earns 55% of the family income is not
a "dependent" within the terms of the act.92
Independent contractors. Whether a person should be treated as an
employee within the scope of the act or as an independent contractor was
discussed in three cases. The following were held to be independent con-
tractors: a handyman who supplied his own tools and ingenuity, 3 and a
laundry truck driver who owned his own truck which bore the name of the
laundry. 4 A lumberman employed as part of a crew and paid by the fore-
84. CLARK, SUMMAR op AMERICAN LAW 91 (1947).
85. Epps v. Railway Express, 40 So.2d 131 (Fla. 1949).
86. Kidd v. Cox, 40 So.2d 454 (Fla. 1949).
87. Miami v. Williams, 40 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1949).
88. Miami v. Williams, 40 So.2d 205 (Fla. 1949); see also White v. Levy, 40
So.2d 142 (Fla. 1949), Edwards v. Miami Shores, 40 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1949), but see
Dopler v. State, 40 So.2d 363 (Fla. 1949), and Citizens Insurance Co. v. Harris, 40
So.2d 775 (Fla. 1949).
89. Groves v. Florida Bottling Co., 40 So.2d 128 (Fla. 1949). Note 10, supra.
90. Jones v. Brink, 39 So.2d 791 (Fla. 1949).
91. Mobile Elevator Co. v. White, 39 So.2d 799 (Fla. 1949).
92. Lewis v. Brandon, 40 So2d 843 (Fla. 1949).
93. Baya's Bar & Grill v. Alcorn, 40 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1949).
94. Dc Luxe Laundry v. Frady, 40 So.2d 779 (Fla. 1949).
11IAMI LAIV QUARTERLY
man, who used equipment supplied by and worked under the general direction
of a sawmill owner, was held to be an employee, althought a specific arrange-
ment had been entered into whereby the injured person, who had formerly
been employed by the sawmill, was to be treated as an employee of the
foreman, 95
Negligence and cause. While the right to recover in workmen's com-
pensation does not depend on proof that the employer has been negligent,
it is still necessary to show that the injury resulted from an accident occurring
during employment. That is basically a question of fact, and findings by the
trier of fact should not be reversed if supported by competent evidence.
Where the evidence shows that injury may have resulted from an accident
occurring during the course of employment, the decision of the deputy com-
missioner should be sustained;06 but where the evidence shows that it could
not have resulted from an accident occurring while employed, that is a matter
of law for the courts on appeals.9 7
While contributory negligence is not a defense in workmen's compensa-
tion cases, it may nevertheless be asserted when the employer sues a person
liable over.98 Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, negligence of the
employee is a defense. 9
DAMAGES. Liquidated damages. Notwithstanding a recent opinionO00 in
which the Supreme Court of Florida threw some doubt upon the validity of
a liquidated damages clause in a contract, the court held such a clause valid
in a recent case.'" The clause operated to reduce the amount proportionately
as partial performance of the contract was received. Amount. While in tort
cases the amount of recovery is largely in the control of the jury,10 2 the
element of pain and suffering affording considerable leeway as also punitive
damages in appropriate cases, damages in contract cases must bear some
connection with the evidence. In a recent case, the court awarded a new trial
where it could not reconcile the verdict with the evidence.' 03 A new trial on
the issue of damages alone may be given in such cases; but where the liability
is not contested, and the amount is the sole issue, a new trial is appropriate.
95. Taylor v. Williams, 40 So.2d 122 (Fla. 1949).
96. Crawford v. Benrus Market, 40 So2d 889 (Fla. 1949).
97. Morris v. American Machinery Corp., 40 So.2d 839 (Fla. 1949). The Industrial
Commission and the courts reversed the deputy commissioner, ruling as a matter of
law that the evidence could not support the finding. Some of the language of the opinion,
however, is consistent with a weighing of the evidence on appeal. See Lester Harris,
Appeals in Workmen's Compensation Cases, 2 MIAmi L. Q. 215 (1948).
98. Cone v. Telephone Co., 40 So.2d 148 (Fla. 1949).
99. Atlantic Coast Line v. Johnson, 40 So.2d 892 (Fla. 1949).
100. Pembroke v. Caudill, 37 So.2d 538 (Fla. 1948), noted in Synopsis, 3 MIAMI
L. Q. 290, 293, 294, 437 (1948-49).
101. Mayo v. New, 40 So.2d 365 (Fla. 1949) and Mayo v. Market Fruit Co., 40
So.2d 555 (Fla. 1949).
102. Usher Garage v. Zander, 40 So.2d 575 (Fla. 1949).
103. Citizens' Insurance Co. v. Harris, 40 So.2d 775 (Fla. 1949).
